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Physician-Assisted 
Suicide 
It would be hard to deny that there is 
a great deal of support in this country - 
and ever-growing support - for 
legalizing physician-assisted suicide 
(PAS). Why is this so? I believe there are 
a considerable number of reasons. I shall 
discuss five common reasons - and 
explain why I do not find any of them 
con~lncing. 
I. 
The coinpelling force of 
heartrending individual cases 
Many people, understandably, are 
greatly affected by the heartwrenching 
facts of individual cases, e.g., a person 
enduring the last stages of A.L.S. ("Lou 
Gehrig's disease"), who gasps: "I want . . . 
I want. . . to die." In this regard the 
media, quite possibly inadvertently, 
advances the cause of PAS. 
A reporter often thinks that the way to 
provide in-depth coverage of the subject 
of assisted suicide and euthanasia is to 
provide a detailed account of a particular 
person suffering from a particular disease 
and asking: "How can we deny this 
person the active intervention of another 
to bring about death?" Or "What would 
you want done if you were in this 
person's shoes?" 
But we should not let a compelling 
individual case blot out more general 
considerations. The issue is not simply 
what seems best for the individual who is 
the focal point of a news story, but what 
seems best for society as a whole. 
Every one interested in the subject of 
PAS and active voluntary euthanasia 
(AVE) has lheard emotional stories about 
people suffering great pain and begging 
for someone to kill them or help them 
bring about their death. But people like 
Kathleen Foley, the Memoiial Sloan- 
Kettering Cancer Center's renowned pain 
control expert, and Herbert Hendin, the 
American Suicide Foundation's executive 
director, can tell very moving stories, too 
- stories militating against the 
legalization of PAS and AVE. They can tell 
us how suicidal ideation and suicide 
requests coinmonly dissolve with 
adequate control of pain and other 
symptoms - or how, for example, after 
much conversation with a caring 
physician, a suicidal patient - one who 
would have qualified for PAS if the 
procedure had been legal - changed his 
mind, how his desperation subsided, and 
how he used the remaining months of his 
life to become closer to his wife and 
parents. 
I can hear the cries of protest now. Let 
terminally ill people (and perhaps others 
as well) do what they want. They're not 
bothering anybody else. Letting them do 
what they want won't affect anybody else. 
But I am afraid it will. We are not 
merely a collection of isolated individuals; 
we are connected to each other in many 
different ways. Therefore, PAS and AVE 
are social issues and matters of public 
policy. 
Suppose a healthy septuagenarian, 
who has struggled to overcome the 
hardships of poverty all his life, wants to 
assure that his two grandchildren have a 
better life than he did. So he decides he 
will sell his heart for $500,000 and 
arrange to have a trust fund established 
for his grandchildren. This does not 
strike me as an irrational or senseless act. 
But would "society" allow this transaction 
to take place? I think not. But why not? 
How can a prohibition against selling 
one's body parts be reconciled with the 
view that we have full autonomy over our 
lives and our bodies? 
It is noteworthy, I believe, that 
although, when it issued its report in 
1994, the New York Task Force on Life 
and the Law recognized that PAS or AlE 
"may be morally acceptable in 
exceptional cases," all of its twenty-four 
members concluded that compelling 
exceptional cases did not justify changing 
the law governing assisted suicide and 
voluntary euthanasia. 
But we should not let a 
compelling individual 
case blot out more 
general considerations. 
The issue is not simply 
what seems best for the 
individual who is the 
focal point ... 
Late last year, a member of the Task 
Force, philosopher and binethicist John 
Arras, looked back on his work on the 
prosect and recalled that he and his 
colleagues were deeply moved by the 
sufferings of some patients, but that all 
twenty-four members were ultimately 
convinced that these patients "could not 
be helped in a public way," that is to say, 
could not be gven publicly-sanctioned 
assistance in committing suicide, without 
endangering a far greater number of 
highly vulnerable patients. 
Professor Arras noted that he and the 
other members of the Task Force were 
painfully aware that whether they 
maintained the total prohibition against 
PAS and AVE or whether they lifted the 
ban for any group of patients, "there were 
bound to be victims." He added: "The 
victims of the current policy are easy to 
identify; they are on the news, the talk 
shows and the documentaries, and often 
on Dr. Kevorhan's roster of 'patients.' But 
who would be the victims of a more 
permissive policy?" 
Professor Arras then maintained, as 
had the Task Force, that whatever criteria 
and procedures for justifiable PAS and 
AVE are ultimately chosen, "abuse of the 
system is highly likely to follow." If PAS 
were legalized, many requests for PAS 
would not be sufficiently voluntary gven 
"the highly predictable failure of most 
physicians reliably to diagnose and treat 
reversible clinical depression, especially 
in the elderly population." As for 
e.xp1oring all reasonable alternatives to 
PAS, "gven the abysmal track record of 
physicians in responding adequately to 
pain and suffering, we can also 
confidently predict that in many cases all 
reasonable alternatives will not have been 
exhausted." 
Professor Arras noted the 
inaccessibility of decent primary care to 
some 37 million Americans, "the 
appalling lack of training in palliative 
care" even among cancer specialists, and 
discrimination on the basis of race and 
economic status in the delivery of pain 
control and other medical treatments. 
And he voiced serious doubts, as did the 
Task Force Report, that any reporting 
system would be sufficiently effective to 
adequately monitor these practices. For as 
the Dutch experience has demonstrated, 
physicians will be most reluctant to 
report instances of PAS and AVE to public 
officials, for fear of highlighting these 
instances at a time when family privacy is 
most needed. The likely result of this lack 
of oversight will be the inability of society 
to respond appropriately to disturbing 
incidents and long-term trends. 
I think Professor Seth Kreimer of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
recently summarized the "fearsome 
dilemma" presented by the assisted 
suicide issue very well when he observed: 
"Forbidding [assisted suicide] leaves 
some citizens with the prospect of being 
trapped in agony or indignity from which 
they could be delivered by a death they 
desire. But permitting such assistance 
risks the unwilling or manipulated death 
of the most vulnerable members of 
society, and the erosion of the normative 
structure that encourages them, their 
families, and their doctors to choose life." 
11. 
Objections to legalizing 
PAS or  AVE are limited 
to religious grounds 
Another reason I think the assisted 
suicide-active voluntary euthanasia 
movement has made so much headway is 
that its proponents have managed to 
convince many that the only substantial 
objections to their proposals are based on 
religous doctrine. 
In November of 1994, Measure 16, 
the Oregon ballo; initiative, was narrowly 
amroved bv the voters and Ore~on 
1 1  / 0 
became the first state to legalize PAS. 
According to press reports, Oregon hght 
to Die and other proponents of PAS 
hammered away at the Roman Catholic 
Church or, a bit vaguely, at those who 
"think they have the divine right to 
control other people's lives." 
I can only say that, so far as I know, 
I have never made a religious objection to 
PAS or AVE. Indeed, the primary reason I 
first wrote about this subject way back in 
1958 was that 1 strongly disagreed with 
the view of British law professor Glanville 
Williams, the leading Anglo-American 
proponent of active voluntary euthanasia 
at the time, who maintained that 
"euthanasia can be condemned only 
according to a religious opinion." (In 
resisting Professor Williams' proposals, 
I took pains to call my article "Some 
Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 
'Mercy-Killing' Legislation.") 
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I think many people share Professor 
Williams' view and that proponents of 
PAS and AVE have done their best to 
exploit this fecling. But I believe the New 
York State Task Force Report is strong 
evidence that Glanville Williams and 
other proponents of PAS are wrong. The 
Report spells out many nonreligious 
objections to legalizing PAS, a number of 
which were summarized by Professor 
Arras, whom I quoted earlier. It was these 
nonreligous concerns that led all twenty- 
four members of the Task Force to reach 
the unanimous conclusion that the total 
ban against assisted suicide should be 
kept intact. 
111. 
PAS and AVE are facts 
of modern life, so we ought to 
legalize and regulate them 
Another argument for PAS that appeals 
to a goodly number of people goes 
something like this: A significant number 
of physicians have been performing 
assisted suicide anyway, so why not 
legalize it? Wouldn't it be better to bring 
the practice out in the open and to 
formulate clear standards than to keep 
the practice underground and 
unregulated? 
It is not at all clear how prevalent the 
underground practice is. As Daniel 
Callahan (President of the Hastings 
Center) and Margot White (a lawyer 
specializing in bioethics) have pointed 
out in a recent article, however, if it is 
truly the case that current laws against 
euthanasia (and assisted suicide) are 
widely ignored by doctors, "why should 
we expect new statutes to be taken with 
greater moral and legal seriousness?" 
Evidently no physician has ever been 
convicted of a crime for helping a 
suffering patient die at her request. But, 
as Callahan and White ask, why should 
we expect that there will be any more 
convictions for violating the new laws 
than there have been for violating the 
laws presently in effect? 
What Dr. Herbert Hendin said this 
spring in testimony before a Congressional 
subcommittee about the impact of 
legalizing euthanasia applies to the 
legalization of PAS as well: Absent "an 
intrusion into the relationship between 
patient and doctor that most patients 
would not want and most doctors would 
not accept," no law or set of guidelines 
covering euthanasia (or assisted suicide) 
can protect patients. Adds Hendin: 
"After euthanasia [or assisted suicide] 
has been performed, since only the 
patient and the doctor may know the 
actual facts of the case, and since only the 
doctor is alive to relate them, any 
medical, legal, or interdisciplinary review 
committee will, as in the Netherlands, 
only know what the doctor chooses to 
tell them. Legal sanction creates a 
permissive atmosphere that seems to 
foster not taking the guidelines too 
seriously. The notion that those American 
doctors - who are admittedly breaking 
some serious laws in now assisting in a 
suicide - would follow guidelines if 
assisted suicide were legalized is not 
borne out by the Dutch experience; nor is 
it likely given the failure of American 
practitioners of assisted suicide to follow 
elementary safeguards in cases they have 
published." 
IV. 
There is little difference 
between ending life support and 
intervening to promote death 
This March, in the course of ruling in 
a case called Compassion in Dying 17. 
Washington that mentally competent, 
terminally ill patients, at least, have a 
constitutionally protected right to assisted 
suicide, an 8-3 majority of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (covering 
California, Washington, Oregon and 
other western states) wrote that it could 
see "no ethical or constitutionally 
cognizable difference between a doctor's 
pulling the plug on a respirator and his 
prescribing drugs which 1711 permit a 
terminally ill patient to end his own life." 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the 
important thing is that "the death of the 
patient is the intended result as surely in 
one case as in the other." 
The Ninth Circuit found the right to 
assisted suicide grounded in the Due 
Process Clause. A month later, in a case 
called Quill 1: Vacco, a three-judge panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit (covering New York, 
Connecticut and Vermont) struck down 
but what seems 
best for society 
as a whole. 
New York's law against assisted suicide on 
equal protection grounds. The Second 
Circuit was no more impressed with the 
alleged distinction between "letting die" 
and active intervention to bring about 
death than the Ninth circuit had been. It 
"seem[ed] clear" to the Second Circuit 
that "New York does not treat similarly 
circumstanced persons alike: those in the 
final stages of terminal illness who are on 
life support systems are allowed to hasten 
their deaths by directing the removal of 
such systems; but those who are similarly 
situated, except for being attached to life- 
sustaining equipment, are not allowed to 
[do so] ." 
The Ninth Circuit's due process 
analysis would seem to apply to active 
voluntary euthanasia as well as PAS. So 
would the Second Circuit's equal 
protection analysis. If persons off life 
support systems are similarly situated to 
those on such systems, why aren't 
terminally ill people who are unable to 
perform the last, death-causing act 
themselves, but who want the active 
intervention of another to bring about 
death, similarly situated to terminally ill 
people who are able to perform the last, 
death-causing act themselves and want to 
enlist the assistance of another in 
bringng about death? 
If a mentally competent, terminally ill 
person is determined to end her life with 
the active assistance of another, but needs 
someone else to administer the lethal 
medicine, how can she be denied t h s  
right simply because she cannot perform 
the last, death-causing act herself? 
Applylng the reasoning of the Second 
I think both the Ninth and Second 
Circuits went awry by lumping together 
different kinds of "rights to die." 
Few slogans are more stirring than the 
"right to die." But few phrases are more 
fuzzy, more misleading or 
more misunderstood. 
Circuit, wouldn't denial of the latter 
person's right constitute - and at this 
point 1 am quoting the very language the 
Second Circuit used - a failure to "treat 
equally all competent persons who are in 
the final stages of fatal illness and wish to 
hasten their deaths"? 
I think both the Ninth and Second 
Circuits went awry by lumping together 
different kinds of "rights to die." Few 
slogans are more stimng than the "right 
to die." But few phrases are more fuzzy, 
more misleading or more misunderstood. 
The phrase has been used at various 
times to refer to (a) the right to refuse or 
to terminate unwanted medical treatment, 
including life-saving treatment; (b) the 
right to assisted suicide, i.e., the right to 
obtain another's help in committing 
suicide; and (c) the right to active 
voluntary euthanasia, i.e., the right to 
authorize another to kill you intentionally 
and directly 
Until March of this year the only kind 
of "right to die" any American appellate 
court, state or federal, had ever 
established - and the only right or 
liberty that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court had recognized in the Karen Ann 
Quinlan case (1976) and the Supreme 
Court had assumed existed in the Nancy 
Beth Cruzan case (1990) - was the right 
to reject life-sustaining medical treatment 
or, as many have called it, the right to die 
a natural death. Indeed, the landmark 
Quinlan case had explicitly distinguished 
between "letting die" on the one hand 
and both direct killing and assisted 
suicide on the other. 
When all is said and done, both the 
Second and Ninth Circuit rulings turn 
largely on the courts' failure to keep two 
kinds of "rights to die" separate and 
distinct - the right to terminate life 
support and the right to assisted suicide. 
And their failure to do so indicates that, 
when faced with the specific issue, they 
are unlikely to keep a third kind of "right 
to die" separate and distinct - active 
voluntary euthanasia. 
I believe the Ninth Circuit was quite 
wrong when it claimed an inability to 
find any "constitutionally cognizable 
difference" between a doctor's "pulling the 
plug" on a terminally ill patient and his 
providing a patient with lethal medicine 
so that she could commit suicide. I think 
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the Second Circuit was equally wrong 
when it concluded that terminally ill 
patients on life-support systems and 
those not on such systems are "similarly 
situated" or "similarly circumstanced." 
The reasons that the cases decided by 
the Ninth and Second Circuit are so 
difficult is that they involve two 
competing doctrines or traditions. The 
right to terminate life support grows out 
of the doctrine of informed consent, a 
doctrine firmly entrenched in American 
tort law. The logical corollary of that 
doctrine, of course, is the right to reject 
medical treatment. The other tradition, 
which has continued to exist alongside 
[he first one, is the anti-suicide tradition. 
This is evidenced by society's discourage- 
ment of suicide (indeed, by the state's 
power to prevent suicide, by force if 
necessary) and by the many laws 
criminalizing assisted suicide. 
In the la90 C1-uzan case, the only 
"right to die" case ever decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court up to now, a 
majority of the Court, perhaps as many as 
eight justices, evidently decided that the 
termination of artificial nutrition and 
hydration was more consistent with the 
rationale of the cases upholding the right 
to reject medical treatment. So far as we 
can tell, only Justice Scalia, who wrote a 
lone concurring opinion, thought the 
case implicated the anti-suicide tradition. 
Justice Scalia's opinion in Cruzan was 
almost totally ignored by his colleagues. 
The other eight justices all iramed the 
issue in terms of a right to be free from 
"unwanted medical treatment" or, more 
specifically, "unwanted artificial nutrition 
and hydration." None of them had 
anything to say about a "right to suicide." 
The Ninth and Second Circuit 
opinions to the contrary notwithstanding, 
there are a number of important 
differences between withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical 
treatment and active intervention to 
promote or to bring about death. 
For one thing, the refusal of life- 
sustaining treatment is an indispensable 
part of medical practice. Approximately 
70 percent of all hospital and nursing 
home deaths follow the refusal of some 
i i form of medical intervention. If society 
I prohibited the rejection of lire-sustaining 
treatment, vast numbers of patients 
would be at the mercy of every 
technological advance in medicine. 
Moreover, if people could refuse medical 
treatment that might turn out to be 
lifesaving, but not discontinue it once 
initiated, many would not seek such 
treatment in the first place. 
In short, letting a patient die at some 
point is a practical condition upon the 
successful operation oi medicine. But the 
same cannot be said oi PAS or physician- 
administered AVE. This is especially so if 
patients' pain is adequately treated 
(although presently it frequently is not) 
and patients understand they have a 
right to refuse treatment or to demand 
the withdrawal of burdensome treatments 
(although presently they often do not). 
Not only would a prohibition against 
rejecting life-sustaining treatment oppress 
many more people than would a ban on 
PAS, it would impose a much more 
severe burden. The prohibition against 
assisted suicide does foreclose an "avenue 
of escape," but it does not totally occupy 
a person's life or make affirmative use of 
his body To deny a person the right to 
terminate life-support, however, is as Yale 
Law Professor Jed Rubenfeld has put it, to 
force one into "a particular, all- 
consuming, totally dependent, and 
indeed rigdly standardized life: the life of 
one confined to a hospital bed, attached 
to medical machinery, and tended to by 
medical professionals." 
To allow a patient to resist unwanted 
bodily intrusions by a physician is hardly 
the same thing as granting her a right to 
determine the time and manner of her 
death. The distinction between a right to 
refuse medical Lreatment and the right to 
PAS is a comprehensible one and a line 
maintained by almost all major Anglo- 
American medical associations. 
I am well aware that the distinction I 
am defending is neither perfectly neai nor 
perfectly logical. But what line is? Surely 
not the line between those who are 
terminally ill and those who will have to 
endure what they consider an intolerable 
life for a much longer period. Nor the 
distinction between assisted suicide and 
active voluntary euthanasia. 
I believe the line between "letting die" 
and actively intervening to bring about 
death represents a cultural and pragmatic 
compromise between the desire to let 
seriously ill people carry out their wishes 
to end it all and the felt need to protect 
the weak and the vulnerable. On the one 
hand, we want to respect patients' wishes, 
,. 
relieve suffering, and put an end to 
seemingly futile medical treatment. Hence 
we allow patients to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment. On the other hand, we want to 
affirm the supreme value of life and to 
maintain the salutary principle that the 
law protects all human life, no matter 
how poor its quality Hence the ban 
against assisted suicide and active 
voluntary euthanasia. 
I venture to say that one of the 
purposes of the distinction between the 
termination of life support and assisted 
suicide (or active voluntary euthanasia) 
- or at least one of its principal effects 
-is to have it both ways. The two sets 
of values are in conflict, or at least in 
great tension. Nevertheless, until now ai 
any rate, we have tried to honor both 
sets. We should continue to try to do so. 
If a right to PAS were 
established, it would only apply 
to the terminally ill 
Most proponents of the right to PAS 
speak only of - and want us to think 
only about - such a right for the 
ternlinally ill. (Terminal illness is 
commonly defined as a condition that 
will produce death "imminently" or 
"within a short time" or in six months.) 
Such advocacy is quite understandable. 
A proposal to legalize PAS, but to limit 
that light to the terminally ill, causes less 
alalm and commands more general 
support than would a proposal to 
establish a broader right to assisted 
suicide. A proposal to permit only 
terminally ill patients to enlist the aid of 
physicians to commit suicide is attractive 
because it leads the public to believe that 
adoption of such a proposal would 
constitute only a slight deviation from 
traditional standards and procedures. 
And: as Justice Frankfurter once 
observed, "the function of an advocate is 
to seduce." 
But there are all sorts of reasons why 
life may seem intolerable to a reasonable 
person. To argue that suicide is plausible 
or understandable in order to escape 
intense physical pain or to end a 
physically debilitated life but for no 
other reason is to show oneself out of 
touch with the depth and complexity of 
human motives. 
A few proponents of assisted suicide 
have taken the position that it would be 
arbitrary to exclude from coverage 
persons with incurable but not terminally 
ill progressive illnesses, for example, a 
person in the early stages of Alzheimer's 
disease. But why stop there? Is it any less 
arbitrary to exclude the quadriplegc? The 
victim of a ~aralvtic stroke? One afflicted 
1 I 
with severe arthritis? The disfigured 
sunivor of a fire? The mangled survivor 
of a road accident? One whose family has 
been wiped out in an airplane crash! 
If personal autonomy and the 
termination of suffering are supposed to 
be the touchstones for physician-assisted 
suicide, why exclude those with non- 
terminal illnesses or disabilities who 
might have to endure greater pain and 
suffering for much longer periods of time 
than those who are expected to die in the 
next few weeks or months? If the 
terminally ill do have a right to assisted 
suicide, doesn't someone who must 
continue to live what she considers an 
intolerable or unacceptable existence for 
many years have an equal - or even 
greater - right to assisted suicide? 
If a competent person comes to the 
unhappy but firm conclusion that her 
existence is unbearable and freely, clearly 
and repeatedly requests assisted suicide. 
and there is a constitutional right to some 
form of assisted soicide, why should she 
be denied the assistance of another to 
end her life just because she does not 
"qualify" under somebody else's 
standards? Isn't this an arbitrary 
limitation of self-determination and 
personal autonomy? As Daniel Callahan 
has observed: "How can self-determination 
have any limits?" If a person is mentally 
competent and determined to commit 
suicide with the assistance of another, 
why aren't her desires or motives - 
whatever they may be - sufficient? 
There is another reason I very much 
doubt that a right to assisted suicide 
could or would be limited to the 
terminally ill for very long - the analyses 
of the two federal appellate courts that 
handed down the "right to die" decisions 
I have discussed earlier. Both the Second 
and Ninth Circuits seemed to share the 
view of proponents of assisted suicide 
who insist that there is no principled 
difference in terms of constitutional 
doctrine and precedent between the 
alleged right to assisted suicide and the 
established right to terminate life support. 
The problem is that the right to reject 
life-sustaining treatment has not been 
" 
limited to the terminally ill. 
One need only recall the Elizabeth 
Bouvia case, which arose a decade ago. 
At the time of the litigation, Ms. Bouvia, 
a young woman afflicted with severe 
cerebral palsy, had a long life expectancy. 
Nor was she unconscious or mentally 
impaired. Indeed, the court described her 
as both "intelligent" and "alert." 
Nevertheless, she was granted the relief 
she sought - the right to remove a 
nasogastric tube keeping her alive against 
her wishes. 
To be sure, neither the Bouvia case nor 
other cases upholding the right of non- 
terminally ill persons to reject life- 
sustaining treatment were decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. But Bouvia and 
these other cases have been well received 
by bioethicists and medico-legal 
commentators. As Professor Alan Meisel 
pointed out in the new edition of his 
treatise on the "right to die," "the right of 
a competent person to refuse medical 
treatment is virtually absolute." If so, and 
if there is no significant distinction 
between "letting die" and active 
intervention to bring about death, how 
can the latter right be limited to the 
terminally ill? 
A Final Remark 
Four decades ago, Glanville Williams, 
a leading proponent of assisted suicide 
and euthanasia, admitted that he 
"prepared for ridicule" whenever he 
described these practices as "medical 
operations" or "medical procedures. " 
"Regarded as surgery,'.' he acknowledged, 
these practices are "unique, since [their] 
object is not to save or prolong life but 
the reverse." Today, few people chuckle 
when PAS is classified as a medical 
procedure - or even when it is called a 
"health care right." 
As my forrner colleague Robert Burt 
recently observed, at a time when tens of 
millions of Americans lack adequate 
health care and Congress has refused to 
do anything about it, it would be most 
ironic if the judiciary were to select PAS 
as "the one health care right that deserves 
constitutional status." 
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